Summa Theologica, Supplement — The Resurrection (Questions 75–86)

Question 75

OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth its term "wherefrom"; the fifth the condition of those who rise again.

Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?

(2) Whether it is universally of all bodies?

(3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?

Article 1: Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body: for it is written (Job 14:12): "Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken." But the heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, "standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Therefore the man that is dead shall never rise again.

Objection 2: Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living" (Mat. 22:32; Ex. 3:6). But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 15) seemingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul's instrument. Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory.

Objection 4: Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final state, and consequently it returns not from this state to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy.

Objection 5: Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears from Gn. 2, even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:25-26): "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my skin," etc. Therefore there will be a resurrection of the body.

Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be restored from death to life.

Further, the members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since "Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more" (Rom. 6:8). Therefore men who are His members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a resurrection of the body.

I answer that, According to the various opinions about man's last end there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. For man's last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have held that man is able to attain this end in this life: wherefore they had no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be able to attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection.

This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of De Civ. Dei (xxii, 22).

Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26): "The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies": and consequently these did not hold the resurrection.

This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, A[3]; *[Cf. FP, Q[49], A[3]]).

Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (De Anima ii, 2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:31): "The fashion of this world passeth away."

Reply to Objection 2: Abraham's soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence life in Abraham's soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and although this life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is compared to the body, not only as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since to the worker is due the reward of the work, it behooves man himself, who is composed of soul and body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial offenses are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body, by death and by its being reduced to ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory.

Reply to Objection 4: Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing.

Reply to Objection 5: Bodily death was brought about by Adam's sin which was blotted out by Christ's death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting.

Article 2: Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written (Ps. 1:5): "The wicked shall not rise again in judgment." Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 12:2): "Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." But these words imply a restriction. Therefore all will not rise again.

Objection 3: Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor. 15:12, seqq.) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again.

Objection 4: Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again.

Objection 5: Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their mother's womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently all will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:28, 25): "All that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall live." Therefore the dead shall all rise again.

Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:51): "We shall all indeed rise again," etc.

Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others' merits, as to children. Therefore all will rise again.

I answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of that same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above (A[1]), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated from the body. Hence no soul will remain for ever separated from the body. Therefore it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again.

Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the particular judgment. or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged [*Jn. 3:18].

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 23) explains "many" as meaning "all": in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses.

Reply to Objection 3: All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.

Reply to Objection 4: Those who have died in original sin have, by dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of original sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again from death: for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than to be detained by death.

Reply to Objection 5: We are born again by the grace of Christ that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came about that He took our nature, since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in natural things. Hence those who die in their mother's womb, although they are not born again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity of their nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the perfection of the human species.

Article 3: Whether the resurrection is natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), "that which is commonly observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under it." Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): "Those who do not hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly to hold it on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?" And he offers as examples the light which "as it were dies . . . and is withdrawn from our sight . . . and again rises anew, as it were, and is recalled—the shrubs which lose their greenery, and again by a kind of resurrection are renewed—and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again as it were": which same example is adduced by the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:36). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural.

Objection 3: Further, things that are against nature abide not for long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is restored by the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

Objection 4: Further, that to which the entire expectation of nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the resurrection and the glorification of the saints according to Rom. 8:19. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

Objection 5: Further, the resurrection is a kind of movement towards the everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if it terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of soul and body will be natural, for since the soul is the body's proper mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

On the contrary, There is no natural return from privation to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one returns from death to life is not natural.

Further, things of the one species have one fixed way of origin: wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of the same species as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on Phys. viii. Now the natural way of man's origin is for him to be begotten of a like in species: and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural.

I answer that, A movement or an action stands related to nature in three ways. For there is a movement or action whereof nature is neither the principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and sometimes from any other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward movement of a stone which terminates in a violent rest. Again, there is a movement whereof nature is both principle and term: for instance, the downward movement of a stone. And there is another movement whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, the latter being sometimes something above nature (as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the principle of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial process. It is impossible for nature to be the principle and not the term, because natural principles are appointed to definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend.

Accordingly the action or movement that is related to nature in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature: but it is called either miraculous or artificial or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that nature (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be natural.

Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is—either the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in the natural alterations of animals—or the passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies. The passive principle of natural generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle corresponding to it in nature, according to Metaphysics viii, 1: nor as to this does it matter whether the active principle in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all other generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for that union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is speaking of those things that are found in all individuals and are caused by the principles of nature. For supposing by a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gathered together in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge, it would not follow that whiteness or existence in some particular place is a natural property of man.

Reply to Objection 2: From natural things one does not come by a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason one may know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of fruition, as the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1): and in like manner the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory evidences of our faith in the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards an operation which terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to nature. Such is not the resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 4: The entire operation of nature is subordinate to the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate to the working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the last end which the whole expectation of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for which reason the attaining thereto is not natural.

Reply to Objection 5: Although there can be no natural movement terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement terminating in a natural rest, as explained above.

Question 76

OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?

(2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is?

(3) Whether the angels are?

Article 1: Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours.

Objection 2: Further, an effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But the resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen again: for God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ's resurrection is not the cause of ours.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing produces the one effect throughout the one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all men. Since then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of the resurrection of others.

Objection 4: Further, an effect retains some likeness to its cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely the wicked, bears no likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection will not be the cause of theirs.

On the contrary, "In every genus that which is first is the cause of those that come after it" (Metaph. ii, 1). Now Christ, by reason of His bodily resurrection, is called "the first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), and "the first-begotten of the dead" (Apoc. 1:5). Therefore His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.

Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which is by justification. But Christ's resurrection is the cause of our justification, as appears from Rom. 4:25, where it is said that He "rose again for our justification." Therefore Christ's resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection.

I answer that, Christ by reason of His nature is called the mediator of God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means of Christ's humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ, in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our grace, because "of His fulness we all have received . . . grace for grace" (Jn. 1:16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man rising again, He is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal cause of our resurrection. Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this very form, whereby the agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness in the begotten. In this way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written (Rom. 8:11): "He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies." And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of His body whereby He healed the leper (Mat. 8:3).

Reply to Objection 1: A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is directed by means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat, however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in the first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's resurrection is said to be the cause of ours, in that it works our resurrection, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power which will work our resurrection in likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works by means of His will which is nearest to the effect; hence it is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that it should happen at the time which God's will has decreed.

Reply to Objection 2: God's power is not tied to any particular second causes, but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by means of other causes: thus He might work the generation of lower bodies even though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet according to the order which He has established in things, the movement of the heaven is the cause of the generation of the lower bodies. In like manner according to the order appointed to human things by Divine providence, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could have appointed another order, and then our resurrection would have had another cause ordained by God.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds when all the things of one species have the same order to the first cause of the effect to be produced in the whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in point, because Christ's humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ's Godhead caused His resurrection immediately, but it causes the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising again.

Reply to Objection 4: The resurrection of all men will bear some resemblance to Christ's resurrection, as regards that which pertains to the life of nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise again to immortal life; but in the saints who were conformed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to glory.

Article 2: Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be the cause of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Thou must believe that the resurrection will take place by God's will, power, and nod." Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of our resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause thereof.

Objection 2: Further, it is useless to make sounds to one who cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting to make a sound to arouse them.

Objection 3: Further, if any sound is the cause of the resurrection, this will only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore a gloss on Ps. 67:34, "He will give to His voice the voice of power," says: "to arouse our bodies." Now from the moment that a power is given to a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, after being restored to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of resurrection, the resurrection would be natural: which is false.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 4:15): "The Lord Himself will come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet of God; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise."

Further, it is written (Jn. 5:28) that they "who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and (Jn. 5:25) they that hear shall live." Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some way be united together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous (Phys. vii, 2). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves Christ to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign. According to some this sign will be literally Christ's voice commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm ceased (Mat. 8:26). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to the words of Mat. 24:27: "As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be." These rely on the authority of Gregory [*Moral. xxxi, as quoted by St. Albert the Great, Sentent. iv, D, 42, A[4]] who says that "the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as judge." According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all nature will obey His command in restoring human bodies: hence He is described as coming "with commandment" (1 Thess. 4:15). In this way His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry [*Mt 25:6], as of a crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a trumpet [*1 Cor. 15:52; 1 Thess. 4:15], either on account of its distinctness, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and called to the feast; and those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the battle in which "the world shall fight . . . against the unwise" (Wis. 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.

Reply to Objection 1: In those words the Damascene touches on three things respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the Divine will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of execution, when he adds "bidding," in resemblance to our own affairs: since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is much more evident, if before we say a word, our servants execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, which sign is called a nod: and this nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish our will. And the Divine nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, which all nature will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to sanctify, not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this sound, whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered. Even so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is known: since judgment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent to the awakening and is not its cause.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would avail, if the power given to that sound were a complete being in nature: because then that which would proceed therefrom would have for principle a power already rendered natural. But this power is not of that kind but such as we have ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, D, 1; FP, Q[62], AA[1],4).

Article 3: Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power than does begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

Objection 2: Further, if this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore the resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

On the contrary, It is stated (1 Thess. 4:15) that "the Lord . . . shall come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an archangel . . . and the dead shall rise again." Therefore the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the angelic ministry.

I answer that, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "just as the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the rational spirit of life": and Gregory speaks in the same sense (Dial. iv, 6). Consequently in all God's bodily works, He employs the ministry of the angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the human body; wherefore in this respect God will employ the ministry of the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately created by God, so will it be reunited to the body immediately by God without any operation of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify the body without the ministry of the angels, just as He immediately glorifies man's soul. This ministry of the angels is called their voice, according to one explanation given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43).

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one Archangel, namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of the Synagogue (Dan. 10:13, 21). Yet he will act under the influence of the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the higher orders will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed either to one or to many angels.

Question 77

OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end of the world?

(2) Whether that time is hidden?

(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?

(4) Whether it will happen suddenly?

Article 1: Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. For there is more conformity between head and members than between one member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may rise again together with the others.

Objection 2: Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii, among St. Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more conformed to Him by grace and merit.

Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, according to Mat. 27:52: "Many of the bodies of the saints, that had slept, arose." Therefore it would seem that the resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.

Objection 4: Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc. 20:4,5. For it is stated there that "I saw . . . the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," and further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." And "the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were finished." Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the end of the world, that all may rise together.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): "Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep," and it is a question of the sleep of death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavens shall be broken.

Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): "All these being approved by the testimony of faith received not the promise," i.e. full beatitude of soul and body, since "God has provided something better for us, lest they should be consummated," i.e. perfected, "without us—in order that," as a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might rejoice the more." But the resurrection will not precede the glorification of bodies, because "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory" (Phil. 3:21), and the children of the resurrection will be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Mat. 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end of the world, when all shall rise together.

I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) "Divine providence decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies": wherefore the entire matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life conformably to Christ Who "rising again from the dead dieth now no more" (Rom. 6:9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return to mortal bodies such as we have now—whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that "any soul will enter any body," as stated in De Anima i, 3.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the head is more conformed to the members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet the head has a certain causality over the members which the members have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with one another. Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's members is not the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently Christ's resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.

Reply to Objection 2: Although among the members some rank higher than others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad Paul. et Eustoch., now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world—or really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Mat. 27:52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection, it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the "first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.

Reply to Objection 4: On account of these words, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or "millenarians." Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 = 100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. 104:8, "The word which He commanded to a thousand," i.e. all, "generations."

Article 2: Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?

Objection 1: It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii). Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that "the woman who represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might feed [Vulg.: 'they should feed her'] a thousand two hundred sixty days." Again (Dan. 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned, which apparently signify years, according to Ezech. 4:6: "A day for a year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee." Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from Holy Writ.

Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of the world." Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly.

On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Mat. 24:36: "Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven." Therefore that time is hidden from men.

Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits of the spirit" (Rom. 8:23)—" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very matter, He answered them (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." Much more, therefore, is it hidden from others.

I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) "as to the last age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it will consist: even so old age, which is man's last age, has no fixed time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone it lasts as long a time as all the others." The reason of this is because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above (A[1]). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this, Christ answered (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power," whereby, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): "He scatters the fingers of all calculators and bids them be still." For what He refused to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.

Reply to Objection 1: When we know a thing's beginning and also its end it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.

Reply to Objection 2: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the state of the New Testament in general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that the occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not." The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true, and in others was deceived.

Article 3: Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be broken" (Job 14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.

Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that "time shall be no longer." Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.

Objection 3: Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what is done therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the night is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most manifest, because when the Lord shall come He "will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts" (1 Cor. 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.

On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for Easter (xxi in Evang.). Therefore our resurrection will also be at night-time.

Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.

I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that Christ arose at such an hour.

Reply to Objection 1: When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that hour.

Reply to Objection 2: The most perfect disposition of time is said to be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it (Apoc. 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

Reply to Objection 3: That time should be adapted to manifestation as regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

Article 4: Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold (Ezech. 37:7,8) where it is written: "The bones came together . . . and I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them." Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.

Objection 2: Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.

Objection 3: Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will not happen suddenly.

Objection 4: Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): "We shall all indeed rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the power of God," and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God, as stated above (Q[76], A[3]). Accordingly that which is done by the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done immediately by God's power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the higher power brings the lower to perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days, in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand, although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.

Reply to Objection 2: Although these actions follow one another in nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the other.

Objection 3: The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its last instant.

Reply to Objection 4: The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which is competent to the angels.

Question 78

OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every case?

(2) Whether ashes are, or dust?

(3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?

Article 1: Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases?

Objection 1: It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord "will come to judge the living and the dead." Now this cannot refer to the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will not die before the judgment.

Objection 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:4) it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but clothed upon." Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']." Therefore the Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you" (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same conclusion follows.

Objection 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be found living.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.

Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." Now all shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death.

I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, "the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature," just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life.

Reply to Objection 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear.

Reply to Objection 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity."

Reply to Objection 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See Editor's note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was vouchsafed—either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without communicating original sin)—or to nature itself which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jn. 8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin.

Reply to Objection 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.

Article 2: Whether all will rise again from ashes?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. 15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.

Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.

Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.

Objection 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term "whereto." Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term "wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.

On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. 5:10, "For if when we were enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go." Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes.

Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.

I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown (A[1]) that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [*Vulg.: 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return']."

Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom."

Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body—for two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. FS, Q[82], A[3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is dissolved.

Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term "wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term "whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term "wherefrom" is the same—for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and to pallor.

Article 3: Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from others: and this is false.

Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in the dust." But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.

On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine (Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing man."

Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.

I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a

natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the sins committed.

Question 79

OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their integrity; (3) about their quality.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?

(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?

(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same parts in which they were before?

Article 1: Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain" (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the resurrection.

Objection 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish body.

Objection 3: Further, after death, as stated above (Q[78], A[3]), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if it be restored from these parts.

Objection 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in identity.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: "In the last day I shall rise out of the earth." Therefore the selfsame body will rise again.

Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is the second rising of that which has fallen." But the body which we have now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.

I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account of robbery and violence, and so forth—and into a body of the same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.

This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf. FP, Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.

In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc. Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.

Reply to Objection 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition, since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the body will rise again identically the same, but of a different condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is understood as though it were in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. FP, Q[76], A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in a previous reply (ad 2).

Article 2: Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii): "Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically." Now such is man's substance in his present state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man cannot be repeated .

Objection 2: Further, where there is a distinction of human nature there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man.

Objection 3: Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not be the same identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same man.

Objection 4: Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1), and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade from the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): "Whom I myself shall see . . . and not another," and he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.

Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise again is naught else but to live again." Now unless the same identical man that died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary to faith.

I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from this—that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated above (Q[75], AA[1],2): otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made. And since it behooves the end to be obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is effected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the recurrence that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to generation and corruption return by generation to specific but not numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water, from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point.

We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another, otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form remains not, and their matter remains under another being.

Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul and the whole man.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about humanity and about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed, there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity.

The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's, according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only, nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the same humanity.

The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form supervening form and matter; which is false.

The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the identity of the rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument affords a very good proof against those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently neither the same animal nor the same man.

But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form "that contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity" (De Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the animal's parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.

Reply to Objection 4: A statue may be considered in two ways, either as a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also. Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails.

Article 3: Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them?

Objection 1: It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, difference of matter causes difference of identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the parts are different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be the self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state that it may be rewarded in due measure.

On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is it necessary in man.

Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man does not cause a change of identity.

I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another. but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity, and how it does not.

But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers organic or heterogeneous parts, but no homogeneous or like parts.

Reply to Objection 2: A change in the position of the parts of matter does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter does.

Reply to Objection 3: Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part but to the whole.

Question 80

OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?

(2) Whether the hair and nails will?

(3) Whether the humors will?

(4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human nature will rise again?

(5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?

Article 1: Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all the members of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital members, for then they "shall neither marry, nor be married" (Mat. 22:30), it would seem that not all the members shall rise again.

Objection 2: Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of man. Therefore the members will not all rise again.

On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore does this apply to the other members.

Further, "The works of God are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members.

I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, "the soul stands in relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient cause." For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in the art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behooves man's body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in man's body must needs be restored at the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since "the whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is to another" (De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the light of the first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glorified.

Reply to Objection 2: The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but with goodly humors.

Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.

Article 2: Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.

Objection 2: Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less therefore will hair and nails.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13). Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not perish."

Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.

I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments: wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are directed to the accomplishment of the souls' operations, for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will rise again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise again in him.

Reply to Objection 1: Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the human body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the protection of the members.

Reply to Objection 2: Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the species.

Reply to Objection 3: Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the individual.

Article 3: Whether the humors will rise again in the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God." Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others.

Objection 2: Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise again with humors.

Objection 3: Further, that which is in process of generation in the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not rise again.

On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that "the body consists of functional members; the functional members of homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors." Therefore the humors will rise again in the body.

Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the other humors.

I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above (AA[1],2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual—either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth—or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the perfection of the person rising again.

The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body: while another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state—either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called "ros," namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins—or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called "cambium": but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called "gluten," and since it belongs to the members it will rise again just as the members will.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep. cxlvi) that "flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood"; wherefore the Apostle's words continue: "Neither shall corruption possess incorruption."

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the members that serve for generation will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of human nature and to show forth its natural power.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in relation to the members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the humors belong to the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect parts.

Article 4: Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it?

Objection 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.

Objection 2: Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature will not all rise again in him.

Objection 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to the truth of human nature.

Objection 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other—on the contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing but human flesh were to beget children that which his child derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.

Objection 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature—on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human nature since whatever is in them is derived from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos—and after these have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them—must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in both of them.

On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in each one.

Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.

I answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached thereto." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature.

Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another.

The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.

These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers according to these opinions.

For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being detached and multiplied.

The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.

On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two opinions agree.

Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argument.

Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; FP, Q[119], A[2]).

Article 5: Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the other members will all rise again.

Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again: which is inadmissible.

On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts of matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in quantity.

Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.

I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not all, thereof will rise again, as stated above (A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the third opinion parts of species are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of things subject to generation and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form; wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the human body.

Question 81

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?

(2) Whether they will be of equal stature?

(3) Whether all will be of the same sex?

(4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?

Article 1: Whether all will rise again of the same age?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youthful age.

Objection 2: Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age.

Objection 3: Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i). Therefore if all are to rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that they should rise again in the age of childhood.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:13): "Until we all meet . . . unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ."

Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age.

Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that age.

I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of decrease begins.

Reply to Objection 1: Old age calls for reverence, not on account of the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in them.

Reply to Objection 2: We speak of age not as regards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from years. Hence Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 3: The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to transform nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humors have not yet reached their ultimate disposition.

Article 2: Whether all will rise again of the same stature?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the same stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in all, since all will rise again of the same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "all things in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth." Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature.

Objection 3: Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the power of nature will never rise again of a greater quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the human bodies will be restored are equally disposed to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the same quantity: and so the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each individual's nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature.

Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of stature.

I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure whereof is gauged according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man.

Reply to Objection 1: It has already been explained (A[1], ad 2) that all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or small quantity.

Reply to Objection 2: The quantity of a particular individual corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature or matter of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: The quantity of those who will be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not belong to the power of the body—nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection—but to nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds of nature.

Article 3: Whether all will rise again of the male sex?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is written (Eph. 4:13) that we shall all meet "unto a perfect man," etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex.

Objection 2: Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24. Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the male sex.

Objection 3: Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i.e. De Generat. Animal. ii) that "the female is a misbegotten male." Therefore the female sex will not rise again.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "Those are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again."

Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gn. 2:22). Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.

I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one another, since there will no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said: We shall all meet "Christ unto a perfect man," this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women.

Reply to Objection 2: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2).

Article 4: Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition and generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (Jn. 21; Lk. 24). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget.

Objection 2: Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.

Objection 3: Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 4: Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since "happiness" according to Boethius is "a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods" (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:30): "In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married."

Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the human race will already have the number of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose.

I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a "dispensation is a relaxation of the general law": because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operations.

Reply to Objection 3: The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the Philosopher's teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude.

Question 82

OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again, and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their subtlety; (3) their agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?

(2) Whether all will be equally impassible?

(3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?

(4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?

Article 1: Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?

Objection 1: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be "a mortal rational animal," for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it is under one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will be passible.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.

Objection 4: Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise again, as stated above (Q[80], AA[3],4). Now, sickness and such like passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrection.

Objection 5: Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible.

On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase of passion results in loss of substance" [*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1]. Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption." Therefore they will be impassible.

Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power." Therefore they will be impassible.

I answer that, We speak of a thing being "passive" in two ways [*Cf. FS, Q[22], A[1]]. First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. In another way we use the word "passive" properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being "a movement contrary to nature." Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be impassible.

The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements, which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of which demand different complexions. Moreover, according to this, impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth [*The other four being the elements; this fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. 1, A[1]). Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because "such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly" (1 Cor. 15:48), and "He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself" (Phil. 3:21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through the cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo ii, 11), "mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because they did not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality." Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences from which the accidental differences result. Hence "mortal" is put in the definition of man, not as though mortality were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body.

Reply to Objection 2: Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection, the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion.

Reply to Objection 3: The elemental qualities are the instruments of the soul, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, seqq., for the heat of fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi) "the Divine power is able to remove" whatever qualities He will "from this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining." Hence even as in a certain respect "He deprived the flames of the Chaldees' furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in another respect that power remained, since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove passibility from the humors while leaving their nature unchanged." It has been explained in the Article how this is brought about.

Reply to Objection 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others' joy (Cf. TP, Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not perish."

Article 2: Whether all will be equally impassible?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have equal immunity from suffering." Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.

Objection 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it cannot be greater in one subject than in another.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.

On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in others.

Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore neither will impassibility be equal in all.

I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself, since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand, if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater cause of impassibility.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself and not in relation to its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Although negations and privations considered in themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to light.

Reply to Objection 3: Some things increase not only by receding from their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases. Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.

Article 3: Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11), "sensation is a kind of passion." But the glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.

Objection 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual* alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject to natural alteration. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"—the mind. Cf. FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration which is requisite for sensation.

Objection 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no new judgment, because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual sensation.

Objection 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Every eye shall see Him." Therefore there will be actual sensation.

Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement." Now there will be actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds" (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.

I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: "The good and the bad are in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i, 13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.

For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" [*Cf. Q[74], A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54). Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations. Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter. that is to say without the material "being" which the species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality is received according to its material "being." Consequently this kind of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the recipient.

Reply to Objection 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally. For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of Augustine, that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 4: When one of two things is the type of the other, the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the operation of another power even as it was with Christ.

Article 4: Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in act?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there. For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act there.

Objection 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such action, as stated above (Q[81], A[4]). Therefore taste would be useless there.

Objection 3: Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the sense of smell is not there in its act.

Objection 4: Further, "Hearing assists teaching" (De Sensu et Sensato i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.

Objection 5: Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a colored body.

Objection 6: Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies.

On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.

Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers, but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps. 149:6, "The high praises of God shall be in their mouth" that "hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God." The same is had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, "With singing and with cymbals." Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we have said (Q[81], A[4]): unless perchance we say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring humor.

Reply to Objection 1: The qualities perceived by the touch are those which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has, through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life, a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.

Reply to Objection 2: Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food, will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have considered smell to be merely a volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration, without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.

Reply to Objection 4: In heaven there will be vocal praise (though indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the sake of the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 2; Q[2], A[2], ad 5).

Reply to Objection 5: The intensity of light does not hinder the spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than defective.

Reply to Objection 6: The more perfect the sense the less does it require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater distance.

Question 83

OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?

(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with another not glorified body?

(3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?

(4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another glorified body?

(5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to itself?

(6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?

Article 1: Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will be "more subtle than the wind and the air," which was condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).

Objection 2: Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies, i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean. Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.

Objection 3: Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle then than now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): "It is sown a corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual," i.e. a spirit-like, "body." But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.

Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most subtle.

I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate. Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that "a subtle thing fills all the parts and the parts of parts." Now that a body has the power of penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over the matter, the term "subtlety" has been transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term "subtlety" is applied to them, not only by reason of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different ways.

For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle describes as being "spiritual" the bodies of those who rise again (1 Cor. 15:44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter between them: and Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because, if this were possible, and one's body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle's meaning, just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural [animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is clearly false.

Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to Lk. 24:39, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have," and Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see God," my Saviour: and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.

Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the elemental nature then than now, unless—either the amount of the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again)—or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.

Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which dominion the glorified body is said to be "spiritual," as being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 56) that "the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual power."

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the subtlety of rarefaction.

Article 2: Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified?

Objection 1: It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For according to Phil. 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory." Now the body of Christ was able to be in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies not glorified.

Objection 2: Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.

Objection 3: Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job 37:18) that "the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten brass." If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able to ascend to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous. [*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. FP, Q[56], A[3]].

Objection 4: Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other bodies.

Objection 5: Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, as in the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two bodies touch one another, because "contiguous things are those whose boundaries coincide" (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body. Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together with another body.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): "Difference of accidents makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place." Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will be but one body numerically.

I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body, unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety. But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 6,7) as being "a place not filled by a sensible body." And a body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.

Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place together with another body, except something in it that requires a different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not make something greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as Boethius says (De Trin.), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupying one place," so that this distinction of individuals requires this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, but it will be possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow (Acts 5:15) not through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body for the perfection of glory.

Reply to Objection 1: That Christ's body was able to be together with another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as in His birth [*Cf. TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): "The same body went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth." Therefore there is no reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.

Reply to Objection 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent. ii, Q[13], A[3]; FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds on a false supposition.

Reply to Objection 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.

Reply to Objection 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.

Reply to Objection 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a place": hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental, because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are said to coincide.

Article 3: Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same place?

Objection 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with one another." Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two. Therefore they are at the same time one and two.

Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either against the common principles—for instance that the part be not less than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a direct contradiction—or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which are infallible deductions from common principles—for instance that the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles. In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in that place.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a proper place.

Objection 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at the same time in different places, except by some kind of transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same place.

On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place.

Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).

I answer that, As shown above (A[2]) the reason why two bodies must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same place.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed: since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.

Reply to Objection 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, as stated above (A[2]), dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other circle described by the locating body.

Reply to Objection 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms of the lesser body.

Reply to Objection 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar), although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.

Article 4: Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body. Because where there is greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.

Objection 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same place with a less subtle glorified body.

Objection 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will be able to occupy the same place.

On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.

Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.

I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two glorified bodies will never be in the same place.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument supposes that a glorified body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another body: and this is not true.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The body of heaven and the other bodies will be said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain share in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified human bodies.

Article 5: Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place?

Objection 1: It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to Phil. 3:21. Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of the glorified bodies.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a glorified body will be in the same place with another body, as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any place however small.

Objection 3: Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's will that it will be able to be in a little or great place, and to have a little or great quantity at will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that "whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself." Now the glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place equal to itself.

Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. Therefore if the place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would be greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.

I answer that, A body is not related to place save through the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is confined through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they are able to have a great quantity, and when they list a small quantity. But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment [*Cf. FS, Q[22], A[1]; FS, Q[41], A[1]] of its substance. Hence in incorruptible, i.e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity however small it may become. And some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and thus they explain how Christ's body came out of the Virgin's womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, Q[1], A[1], ad 5; TP, Q[77], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's argument is that for the same reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the parts of a glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the objection does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body. Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it will [*Cf. TP, Q[55], A[4]]. On the other hand, being in a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen is by reason of its color. Consequently the comparison fails.

Article 6: Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.): "What is palpable must needs be corruptible." But the glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it. But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another body, it will not be palpable.

Objection 3: Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.

On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His body was palpable, as appears from Lk. 24:39: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones." Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpable.

Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.

I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities, and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "whatever is palpable must needs be corruptible." Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature though changed in glory."

Reply to Objection 1: The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Although in a way it is possible for a glorified body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is palpable.

Reply to Objection 3: In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.

Question 84

OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

(2) Whether they will move?

(3) Whether they will move instantaneously?

Article 1: Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds "to meet Christ, into the air" (1 Thess. 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile.

Objection 2: Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else they would always move in the same direction. Therefore they are not agile.

Objection 3: Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.

Objection 4: Further, nature gives different animals instruments of different disposition according to their different powers: hence she does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God's works are much more orderly than those of nature. Since then the glorified body's members will have the same disposition, shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no agility other than it has now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power," that is, according to a gloss, "mobile and living." But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore the glorified bodies will be agile.

Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual according to 1 Cor. 15:44. Therefore they will be agile.

I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject to the glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body, but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and this perfection is called "the gift of the glorified body." Now the soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to the glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul.

Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e. the heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable (Q[82], A[1]; Q[83], A[1]). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.

Reply to Objection 1: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in order to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will show them.

Reply to Objection 2: The more the power of the moving soul dominates over the body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be counter to the body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more adapted to obey the moving spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of the glorified body's aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul, there will be no labor in the saints' movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints' will be agile.

Reply to Objection 3: By the gift of agility the glorified body will be rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and for the execution of all the other operations of the soul.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as nature gives to fleeter animals instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that property of glory which is called agility.

Article 2: Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 2), "movement is the act of the imperfect." But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any movement.

Objection 2: Further, all movement is on account of some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima, lxiii [*Cf. Q[70], A[2], ad 1]), "all thou willest will be there, and nothing that thou willest not." Therefore they will not move.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo ii), "that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it more excellently than that which shares it with movement." Now the glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human bodies remain so.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul being established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.

Objection 5: Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted of all has the highest place of all, according to Heb. 7:26, "Made higher than the heavens," where a gloss [*Gloss on Heb. 1:3: "On the right hand of the majesty"] says, "in place and dignity." And again each glorified body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be moved.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 40:31): "They shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint"; and (Wis. 3:7): "(The just) shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds." Therefore there will be some movement in glorified bodies.

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was moved in His ascension, and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean [*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. FP, Q[56], A[3]]. But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will nowise diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "wherever they are sent their course lies in God."

Reply to Objection 1: Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (Phys. viii, 7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such like defects will remain in glorified bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would prove if the glorified body were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.

Article 3: Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?

Objection 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever the spirit listeth there will the body be." Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.

Objection 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun's ray." Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6. Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.

On the contrary, In local movement space. movement and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore this movement will not be instantaneous.

Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" and partly in a term "whereto," as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed; and it is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous.

I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another.

Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and "vice versa"; wherefore in such things "to be changing precedes to be changed," as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass through every interval.

Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which is impossible.

To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another.

Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is little lacking is as it were not lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: "I do so and so at once," when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that "wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the body be forthwith." Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall determine.

Reply to Objection 2: Some have demurred to this proposition of the Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.

But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The same applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 + 1 is not as 2 to 4.] And so there would not be the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.

Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something extrinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.

Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add no retardation to the movement.

It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said in reference to the heavenly bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover, that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater, according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.

Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.

Reply to Objection 5: Although after the resurrection the time which is the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of movement.

Question 85

OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?

(2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?

(3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a non-glorified body?

Article 1: Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), "every luminous body consists of transparent parts." But the parts of a glorified body will not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not lightsome.

Objection 2: Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on Job 28:17, "Gold or crystal cannot equal it" (Moral. xviii, 48). "There," that is in the heavenly country, "the grossness of the members will not hide one's mind from another's eyes, and the very harmony of the body will be evident to the bodily sight." Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome.

Objection 3: Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in their subject, since "light is the extreme point of visibility in an indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body" (De Sensu et Sensato iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 3), "the body's beauty is harmony of parts with a certain charm of color": and it will be impossible for the glorified bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be lightsome.

Objection 4: Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a greater disposition to clarity than another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"—the mind. Cf. FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; FS, Q[52], A[1] ,3m] than the bones, the humors than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those bodies to be lightsome.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 13:43): "The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father," and (Wis. 3:7): "The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds."

Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory," which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the previous context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome.

I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have often remarked (Q[84], A[1]), it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul's glory into the body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory says on Job 28:17, "Gold or crystal cannot equal it."

Reply to Objection 1: Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency. Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however, clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.

Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of Gregory.

Reply to Objection 3: The glory of the body will not destroy nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body, for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their regard.

Article 2: Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified eye?

Objection 1: It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.

Objection 2: Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also will then be greater than it is now, according to Is. 30:26, and the clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.

Objection 3: Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a non-glorified eye.

On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, "Made like to the body of His glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the Transfiguration." Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be visible to non-glorified eyes also.

Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle. But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally, because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight, and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [*The dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.

Reply to Objection 1: The clarity of glory will differ generically from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species. Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a glorified body is not passible to a passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]], so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits* asunder. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"—the mind. Cf. FS, Q[50], A[1] ,3m; FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).

Reply to Objection 3: The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus.

Article 3: Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be lightsome. Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, every body which hides other bodies that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.

On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being made like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will the glorified body be necessarily seen.

Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.

I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.

Reply to Objection 1: This clarity will be obedient to the glorified body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.

Reply to Objection 2: A body's color does not prevent its being transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight cannot be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide a body that is behind it.

Reply to Objection 3: Quantity is inherent to the glorified body itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the soul's command.

Question 86

OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?

(2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?

(3) Whether they will be impassible?

Article 1: Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.

Objection 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will their deformity be taken away.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead shall rise again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead, i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs." Therefore the wicked will rise again without their deformities.

Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without these defects.

I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place—which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some say that such like deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Consequently those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not, while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world; which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its species.

Reply to Objection 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.

Article 2: Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Objection 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them."

Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment both in soul and body (Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting punishment." But this would not be possible if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.

I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on (A[3]), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one thing another is generated.

Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the grace of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed.

Reply to Objection 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed are conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it: whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in accordance with nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This incorruptibility will result from nature, not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle of corruption, as shown above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although death is simply the greatest of punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow." Accordingly just as life is simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in "everlasting death," according to the Psalm (48:15): "Death shall feed upon them."

Article 3: Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), "increase of passion results in loss of substance." Now "if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away" (Phys. i, 4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false (A[2]). Therefore they will be impassible.

Objection 2: Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 3: Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi, 2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "And we shall be changed": and a gloss says: "We—the good alone—will be changed with the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory."

Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be passible.

I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion, corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another. For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion which we call "passion of nature." In another way one thing is received into another spiritually by way of an "intention," just as the likeness of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things: wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of passion which we call "passion of the soul." Since therefore after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated above (A[2]), it will not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to be passible.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the passion whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent, and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, because the species which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element.), "no animal can live in fire." Galen also (De simp. medic.) says "that there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire"; although sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing.

Reply to Objection 4: Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its natural disposition, as stated above (A[2]). Consequently, however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the soul.

TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)